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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence introduced at trial and assumed to be 
true by the trial court in its f.i -ilnqs was clear that the 
motor behicle under Mr. Bean's control at the time of his 
arrest, was inoperable, and that Mi . i^dn ridu not driven 
the vehicle to where it became inoperable. The Court 
should have taken these facts into consideration and found 
that Mr. Bean was not in actual physical control of an 
operable motor vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS DO NOT 
SUPPORT MR. BEAN'S CONVICTION. 
In Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982), 
the Utah Supreme Court noted: 
The standard for appellate review 
of factual findings affords great 
deference to the trial court's view of 
the evidence unless the trial court 
has misapplied the law or its findings 
are clearly against the weight of 
evidence. _Id. a t 65 3. 
In this case, r 11 Be a n d o e s n't question the 
accuracy of the trial court's findings. In fact, it is 
\ ; position that the trial court's findings are correct. 
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In their entirety, the court's findings are as 
follows: 
FINDING OF FACT 
The court finds the following to 
have been established: 
On November 2, 1985, the 
defendant, David A. Bean, was observed 
by a Sandy City police officer sitting 
behind the steering wheel of a motor 
vehicle, attempting to start the same. 
The defendant was never observed in 
the passenger side of the vehicle, the 
defendant said he was having car 
trouble and told the officer to "smell 
the carb'." 
The only direct evidence on the 
issue of who had driven the vehicle to 
the spot where the defendant was 
observed trying to start it was 
provided by the defendant and his 
brother, Michael Bean. At trial, each 
testified that Michael Bean had been 
driving the vehicle. (R at 63). 
Further, in applying these findings, the trial court 
stated that it accepted as true Mr. Bean's claim that his 
brother drove the vehicle to the place where the officer 
arrested Mr. Bean. (R at 64). 
Under the Garcia standard of review language, Mr. 
Bean's only contention in this appeal is that the trial 
court misapplied the law. Without making a finding as to 
whether the vehicle was operable, the trial court held 
that the fact that Mr. Bean was behind the wheel of the 
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vehicle, attempting to start the vehicle, was sufficient 
to establish that Mr. Bean was in actual physical control 
of the vehicle for purposes of the Sandy City DUI 
Ordinance. 
However, the trial court also noted the Utah Supreme 
Courtfs holding in Garcia, that: 
[the] purpose of the actual 
physical control language of Utah's 
implied consent statute should be read 
as intending to prevent intoxicated 
drivers from entering their vehicles 
except as passengers or passive 
occupants... (R at 64), quoting Garcia 
at 654. 
Sandy City, in its Brief, admits that, "If a vehicle is 
visibly inoperable...an occupant would generally not be in 
actual physical control." Brief of Respondent at page 13. 
These statements exhibit a fundamental inconsistency in 
the position taken by the trial court and Sandy City. 
First, if a vehicle is inoperable, it is inoperable 
whether or not the problem with the vehicle is readily 
apparent. Second, if the vehicle is inoperable, then 
anyone who occupies the vehicle can be no more than a 
passive passenger. In the case at issue, the vehicle was 
inoperable. It would not start at the time of Mr. Bean's 
arrest, nor would it start after it was towed to the 
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impound garage. The vehicle would not start until Mr. 
Bean's brother put gas in it. 
The purpose of this appeal is to determine from the 
findings of the trial court if Mr. Bean was in "actual 
physical control" of the vehicle. Although the trial 
court did not make a specific finding concerning the 
operability of the vehicle Mr. Bean was in, the facts show 
that it would not run. This is important because the 
trial court accepted the fact that Mr. Bean did not drive 
the vehicle to the place where the officer arrested him. 
Therefore, if Mr. Bean was in "actual physical control" of 
the vehicle, it must have been from the time when his 
brother left the vehicle to the time that the officer 
arrived at the scene. 
The decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and other 
jurisdiction as set forth in Mr. Bean's Brief of Appellant 
indicate that operability of a vehicle is a factor to be 
considered in determining whether a person in the vehicle 
is in actual physical control. Therefore, findings of the 
trial court do not support Mr. Bean's conviction 
under Sandy City Ordinance §119(1)(a). 
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II. REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER AS TO 
WHETHER MR. BEAN COULD EXERCISE ACTUAL 
PHYSICAL CONTROL OVER THE VEHICLE. 
The circumstances surrounding Mr. Bean's arrest are 
important because they distinguish his case from the cases 
Sandy City cited to support Mr. Bean's conviction. 
Garcia, supra, Lopez v. Schwendimanf 720 P.2d 778 
(Utah 1986) , and most of the others cited by Sandy City 
rely on facts which either establish that the person 
arrested drove the vehicle to the place where the police 
made the arrest, or that the person arrested could have 
operated the vehicle. 
In citing Lopez in its Brief at page 11, Sandy City 
misrepresents the context in which the statement quoted 
was made. While the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
statute was not to be construed to exclude those whose 
vehicles were immobile due to mechanical failures, the 
language of the court leading up to this statement 
indicates that operability can be a factor in examining 
whether a person has actual physical control over a 
vehicle. The court nol-orl, wifh approval, t ho drr-ision by 
the Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Smelter, 674 
P.2d 690, 693. In Smelter, the court recognized that no 
single fact establishes guilt or innocence in DUI cases. 
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It is the totality of the circumstances upon which a 
conviction is to be based. That is: How did the vehicle 
get to the point where the arrest was made; what type of 
authority did the arrested person exert over the vehicle 
and by implication, what was the operating condition of 
the vehicle? Lopez at 781. 
The fact that the vehicle in which Mr. Bean was found 
was inoperable, by itself, does not establish his 
innocence. However, that fact, when viewed with the fact 
that Mr. Bean did not drive the vehicle to the place 
where the police arrested him, shows that Mr. Bean was never 
in "actual physical control" of an operable vehicle. 
While the facts in the case at issue may or may not have 
been sufficient to justify revocation of Mr. Bean's 
license in an administrative action as was the case in 
Lopez and Garcia, they do not satisfy the standard of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, necessary to uphold Mr. 
Bean's criminal conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments contained herein and those 
contained in Mr. Bean's Brief of Appellant, Mr. Bean 
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requests this Court set aside his conviction tor driving 
under the influence of alcohol. 
DATED this *( day of March, 1989. 
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